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The Electronic Information Industry ["the Industry"] grew from an infant into an 
economic giant over the 20th Century but suffers today from twin signs of maturity – a 
deep recession and pronounced symptoms of monopoly power.1 The recession will pass, 
and the Industry will remain central to all developed economies. But monopoly power 
does not self-cure in cycles.  
This survey article asks why the Industry has spawned monopoly power in so many of its 
markets and what, if anything, public policy should do about it.
These questions open issues as sprawling and intricate as the Industry itself.  This survey 
necessarily resorts to gross simplifications:  the devil here often lurks in the details, but I 
must usually leave him there, unattended.  I have also had to rely too often on mere 
impressions from long toiling in the Industry: monopoly power is well-understood
conceptually but has rarely, in this or any other industry, been subjected to rigorous 
empirical study.  
1. The Industry and its products became major factors in the US economy over the 20th century – and a 
central cause of the late century boom in GDP and the subsequent stalling of the entire national economy. 
In 1900 the Information consisted only of telegraphy and the beginnings of local telephone services.  By 
2001, the Industry had mushroomed so that, in the U.S. alone, the  gross domestic product for that year 
contributed by economic segments substantially or entirely subsumed within this Industry were:
• Telephone and telegraph services:  $218.5 billion
• Radio, television, and motion pictures: $108.4 billion
• Printing and publishing:  $100.2 billion
• Electronics and electrical equipment: $161.2 billion
See: Industry Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce, 
(annual  GDP statistics accessible through http://www.bea.doc.gov.  US gross  private domestic investment 
in "equipment and software" climbed 16% from 1998 to 2000, from $3275.5 billion to $3806.3 billion, but 
then declined by 10% over the first two years of the 21st Century, falling to $3392.6 billion. NIPA Data of
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, tables of quarterly data findable at www.economagic.com/em-
cgi/dta.exe/beana/t101/10. As defined by the Census Bureau, the "information industry" itself invested 
$146.3 billion in non-structure capital equipment in 2001(out of an economy total of $1.1 trillion).  This 
represented a decline of 8.7% from the industry's 2000 investment level, which had by contrast grown 
10.9% in 2000 and 7.8% in 1999.   See: Annual Capital Expendiures Survey: 2001, U.S. Census Bureau, 
accessible through http:www.census.gov/csd/ace-pdf.html.
3To impose coherence on the survey, I have focused throughout on a single norm –
"economic value added" (or, economic "efficiency"), as defined by neo-classical welfare 
economics.
The paper's chief conclusions are:
1. Though highly diverse, the Industry conducts throughout three basic activities or 
functions:  authoring, publishing, and distributing.
2. The economics of these functions bear the strong influence of two peculiar 
phenomena:
• Information products are inherently "non-rivalrously sharable".
• Industry markets are highly vulnerable to "creative destruction ". 
 
Both of these phenomena are potential sources of enormous economic value.
3. Though monopoly power in the Industry sometimes arises from familiar mechanisms –
e.g. superior performance by certain firms, horizontal combinations among firms, and 
scale economies – three less familiar mechanisms are often the source:
• Excessive government protection of intellectual property rights.
• Monopoly allocations of radio spectrum frequencies.
• The private use of "closed standards" to appropriate the network effects generated 
by a market.
• And the leveraging of monopoly power across market boundaries.
4. Government can best increase the economic value created by the Industry through five
policy reforms:
• Reducing legal protection of intellectual property.
• Ceasing "over-enclosure" of the commons of the radio spectrum.
• Promoting "open standards".
• Exercising more anti-trust scrutiny of "nationalizing" mergers and acquisitions of 
regionally monopolized information distribution networks.
• Adopting simpler and tougher rules against the leveraging of monopoly power 
across markets.
Similar policy recommendations could emerge from consulting "non-economic" norms
such as First Amendment values, concern for a diversity of editorial voices, or a simple 
bias toward creative ferment.  This similarity of results suggests, perhaps, that the "law 
and economics" approach has now achieved more sophistication – or sheer ambiguity! –
than its loudest proponents and detractors often acknowledge.
4I. Symptoms of Monopoly Power
Even a quick scan of headlines reveals major symptoms of monopoly power in the 
Industry:2
• Telecommunications services:  
-- Most local fixed-line systems remain total monopolies.
-- The eight Baby Bells have shrunk by merger to four (Verizon, SBC, 
Bell South, and Qwest), and each is pushing against waning regulatory resistance 
toward adding long distance service.  This will likely shrink long distance providers 
to a small handful. Ma Bell is being resuscitated.
-- Cellular phone services are now down to two players in most national 
markets, and the US market is widely thought heading soon toward two or three.
-- Yesterday's flowering of multiple, entrepreneurial Internet Service 
Providers has withered away, and the reigning phone and cable giants are now 
clearly destined to dominate that business.
• Cable TV systems:
-- Nearly every locality and metropolitan region is served by a local 
monopoly.
-- At the US national level, two giant companies, Comcast and the Time 
Warner cable system, have grown to dominate the scene via multiple mergers.
Similar consolidations are the rule in most other national markets.
• Satellite TV systems:
--  A single firm, News Corp., dominates this segment outside the US.
-- Two players, News Corp./Direct TV and Echostar, will soon likely
remain to compete for the whole US market.
• Content Media:
-- Radio broadcasting is rapidly consolidating into a few national 
networks.
-- National TV broadcasting now numbers a small handful of networks in 
the US, fewer in other world markets. 
2
 Aside from the general business media, no single periodical or website seeks to cover the business of the 
entire Industry.  Its broad segments are regularly surveyed by such publications as:  Infoworld Magazine
and Computerworld magazines (computer hardware and software), Telecommunications magazine 
(telecommunications and data communications); Broadcast, Cablenews, and Multi-Channel News
magazines (television); C-Net.com and Internet.com  (the Internet and the World Wide Web); etc. Also, the 
Economist magazine fairly regularly  publishes a well-written quarterly review of information technology 
developments and seeks to keep its weekly readers well abreast of major Industry news.
5-- Cable program channels, while numerous, are clumping rapidly into a 
definite oligopoly structure for the most consequential channels.
-- Movies remain dominated by a few major "studios", acting as "mass 
marketers".
-- The "mass media" generally are huddled into several mega-
conglomerates of national, and often global, scale.  These conglomerates, in turn, are 
being forced or seduced into "vertical integration" with the already monopolizing
distribution network providers who use the Industry's several major electronic 
distribution technologies.
• "Software":
-- Microsoft is seeking, with considerable success, to leverage its 
monopolies in desktop operating systems and applications software into  similar 
dominance in every market even remotely "related" to those products – from server 
operating systems, database management systems, and business applications 
software, through operating systems for PDA's, cell phones, video game boxes, and 
cable set-top boxes, to web portals and every conceivable web application, web 
portals, and indeed the entire architecture for so-called "web services".
-- Currently, relational database management software is dominated by 
Oracle, IBM, and Microsoft, and enterprise-wide business application software by 
SAP, Oracle, and Peoplesoft.
• "Hardware":
-- Intel dominates the world microprocessor industry.
-- Computer systems markets are dominated by IBM (in mainframes) and 
Dell (in PC based computers).
-- Big communications systems markets are dominated by Cisco, Lucent, 
and Nortel.
To diagnose the sources of these several market-concentrating trends, and the economic 
ailments they may cause, it is first necessary to sketch out a taxonomy for the Industry 
and then to survey briefly the conceptual tools available to analyze the "welfare 
economics" of monopoly power.
II. Industry Taxonomy
The Information Industry is a vast organism of diverse parts -- products, services, and 
markets -- with no widely-recognized outer boundaries or interior segments.  I will try to 
make do with a very simple map.
While including within the "Industry" the usual trio of "communications, media, and 
technology", I will focus on their "electronic" manifestations.  These arose first with 
6telegraphy in the 19th Century, spread into telephony, movies, radio, and TV in the first 
half of the 20th Century, and have since World War II sprouted in all directions from the 
revolution in digital computation and communications.
I will define as an "information product" any good (or service) that consists at core of 
an intangible, deliberately-ordered set of data meant to inform, communicate, entertain, 
or educate, or directly to facilitate these objectives. Such products are often temporarily 
embedded in some "tangible" packaging for convenient storage, delivery or actual use 
(e.g. print on paper, a floppy disc, a hard drive, a flickering monitor, etc). I will exclude
from the Industry products which, though increasingly "information rich", are meant for 
some purpose other than communicating, informing, educating, or entertaining, e.g. cars, 
airplanes, pharmaceuticals, factory robots, microwave ovens, genetically modified plants 
and foods, etc. 
I will sometimes distinguish between two broad classes of information products:
• "Poems" are intelligible directly by mere mortals, e.g.: conversations, email and 
instant messages, live and recorded speeches, written reports, newspapers and 
online reportage, magazines and e-zines, short stories and novels, compilations 
of data, ads, posters and billboards, live plays, rock concerts, rap songs and 
symphonies, paintings, movies, 3-D cartoons, web pages, etc.
• "Platforms" are certain "software programs". Software programs are fully
intelligible only to other software programs or to programmed silicon chips. The 
software programs I include within the Industry are meant ultimately (though 
often only by being strung together) either to host or to deliver "poems", e.g.:
operating systems, middleware, and database frameworks for general purpose 
computers or for PDA's, digital phones, TV set-top boxes, video game machines, 
etc., and business, educational, and entertainment applications software used in 
stand-alone or networked settings.  I exclude from the Industry software that 
merely forms an integral component of, and is thus functionally inseparable 
from, a "machine" whose purpose lies outside the Industry's objectives – such as 
an airplane, an air conditioning system, an ATM machine, etc.
The many functions or activities carried out within the Industry – the "verbs" around 
which the Industry's firms typically organize themselves – I will group into three broad 
categories (setting to one side general management and administration, which are found 
in all firms):
• "Authoring":  This is the raw creation of new information products, i.e.:  the 
activity of artists, music composers and performers, script writers, directors, 
animators, software programmers, anyone who converses with others (in live 
synchrony or otherwise), etc. Considered more broadly, "authoring"  constitutes 
the  basic engine of "innovation" in the Industry, essential for creating not only 
new products but also new business methods, models, and approaches to the 
market place.
7• "Publishing":  In this team activity I include the fairly routine tasks of
assembling, editing/testing, branding, and promoting/marketing/selling poems 
and platforms. The end product of publishing I will call "publications".
• "Distributing":  This activity consists of hosting or delivering information 
products (whether "raw" poems, publications or platforms) for access by their 
intended users. In the electronic Industry, this activity invariably includes 
"platforms" as critical components, but often accompanied by some sort of 
"network" and its related services.
Finally, by a "market" I will mean information products which some coherent group of 
customers regard as close substitutes.  Because "coherent" and "close" are relative 
concepts, market definitions are inherently plastic, and a market can almost always be 
further divided into narrower markets.  The "economic characteristics" of a given market 
depend on the nature of its product and of the functions necessary to supply it, and of 
course on the actual behavior of the suppliers and the surrounding regimes of law or 
regulation.
Two peculiar features of the Industry merit notice at the outset, as bearing importantly on 
the Industry's economics. 
 
• "Non-rivalrous use" of information products:
Conventional economic analysis takes for granted certain basic notions of "property" 
and "contract law".  The analysis regards a market's product and input resources as 
myriad discrete items that are privately "ownable" by the firms, which can buy and 
sell them, with each item usable exclusively by its owner. But an information product 
(whether an end-use product or an "input" resource for making other products) is at 
its core an intangible set of data. Once stripped of its tangible packaging medium, it 
becomes "non-rivalrous in use": absent some "law" decreeing otherwise, you and I 
can share that product without impinging on each other's use of it.  This makes
society's choice of a regime of "property" and "contract" law an important issue for 
economic evaluation.
• The importance of "cross-market" behavior:
Micro-economics focuses most of its tools and concepts on the behavior of firms 
within a defined market. "Market power" and "competitive processes" usually refer to 
intra-market phenomena. In the Information Industry, however, the cross-market
behavior of firms has peculiar importance, for two reasons.  
First, digital technologies have made the "authoring" function -- and "innovation"
generally – progressively cheaper, faster, and easier. This has shortened all product 
8life-cycles and made the whole Industry a classic arena for "creative destruction"3. 
This lovely term means the frequent, unpredictable and disruptive emergence of 
entirely new types of products that eradicate old market boundaries. Such radical 
"market-morphing" is often the Industry's most critical "competitive process", its
chief engine for innovation, growth, and economic value creation. Therefore how 
"monopoly power" may affect the process of "creative destruction" across market 
boundaries is a significant policy issue in the Industry. 
Second, "platform" products – i.e. software programs – typically ride atop or beneath 
each other. Platforms must "interoperate" with each other, and ultimately with poems
and publications, according to particular standards or protocols if those platforms, 
publications, or poems are to reach their intended users. 
These two phenomena – creative destruction and inter-operability -- riddle the 
Industry, creating unusual symbiosis, complementarity, and competition across its
individual market boundaries. The phenomena are particularly evident across 
"distribution function" markets, and between "distribution" and "publishing function"
markets.  
 
III. The Welfare Economics of Monopoly Power
"Monopoly power" is most concisely defined as the ability of a firm to influence 
significantly the market price of a product4.  
Absent monopoly power – i.e. in a "perfectly competitive" market -- each firm must take 
the market's prevailing price as a given and is able to choose only the quantity and 
character (i.e. the quality or features) of the product the firm will supply to the market.  
Monopoly power notoriously eludes direct detection, much less accurate measurement. 
So, economists and policymakers generally fall back on market share concentration as a 
proxy for monopoly power. This is at best only a very rough proxy:  even in a highly 
concentrated oligopoly, firms may find themselves without any significant, durable
power to influence the market's prevailing price level5.
Given certain assumptions, welfare economics has shown that a fully competitive market 
will "optimally" allocate resources within a market and between it and the wider 
3
 This term was coined in 1942 – well before the advent of commercial computers -- by the Harvard 
political economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 82-85 (3rd.ed. 1975).
4
 Monopoly power is often called "market power" and is, however labeled, a concept of degree.  Few 
markets have only one vendor, and a single firm's ability to influence a market's prevailing price level 
depends not only on the firm's share of the market but also upon the particular market's demand and supply 
curve elasticities.  See generally Herbert Hovencamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the law of competition and 
its practice 81 (2d ed. 1999).
5 Ibid.
9economy.6  The market will gravitate toward an equilibrium point (at the intersection of 
the market's  down-sloping demand and up-sloping supply curves), which maximizes the 
"economic value added" by the market to the general economy:  this "value-added" is the 
difference between what each of the market's customers would be willing to pay for the 
product and the total costs incurred by all the firms supplying the market (i.e. the area 
under the market demand curve minus that under the market supply curve).
By contrast, to the extent it exercises "monopoly power", a firm can maximize its own 
profits by shifting the market's price level upward, and the total product quantity supplied 
to the market downward, creating a so-called "deadweight loss" to the market's 
allocational efficiency, i.e. reducing the total value-added (i.e. supplier profits plus 
consumer surplus) generated by the market to the wider economy.
Economists and antitrust analysts generally trace the presence of monopoly power to one 
or more of five sources .  Whether and how monopoly power may reduce economic value-
added by a market, and therefore whether and how "policy" should respond to such 
power, vary by the power's source.
• Temporarily superior performance:  
One firm may garner an "abnormally" large share of a robustly competitive market –
and thus gain some monopoly power -- by what antitrust doctrine traditionally sums 
up as "superior skill, foresight, and industry"7. Such feisty behavior benefits the 
economy longer term, either by lowering the feisty firm's (and thus the market's) 
supply curve or -- if the "superior skill" centers on branding and marketing prowess --
by elevating the market's overall (i.e. "all-brands") demand curve.  In either case, 
"superior performance" will typically generate an eventual net increase in the 
market's "value added". Analysts implicitly assume that a firm's superiority will be
transient: lagging competitors will fairly quickly "learn the tricks" of the market 
leader and proceed to match or leapfrog its performance. For all these reasons, 
superior competitive performance not only is tolerated but celebrated by 
policymakers.  
• Horizontal combination: 
Policymakers universally condemn "naked" conspiring among competitors to "fix" 
their prices or supply quantities, because this gives them, acting in concert, a 
monopoly power each would lack individually8. Of course, this same price/quantity 
fixing power also accompanies so-called "horizontal" (i.e. intra-market) mergers and 
joint ventures, but in those situations the deadweight loss may in some cases be more 
than offset by the value-enhancing effect of the supply (cost) efficiencies that can
result from actually merging the firms' operations.  So a horizontal merger may, net-
6
 Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 
Econometrica 269 (1954).
7
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d. cir. 1945)
8
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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net, either shrink or enlarge a market's total value-added, a policy judgment typically 
made case by case.
• Government monopoly grants: 
Government not infrequently confers legal monopoly status on a particular 
competitor.  The reasons vary – e.g. sheer politics, helping the preferred competitor 
raise private investment capital to create some socially desirable new product which
the state, for whatever reason, prefers not to subsidize through the public treasury, or 
eliminating some side-effect of normal competition that the government thinks 
baleful. Policy analysts usually assess a monopoly grant by examining the economic 
merits of its ostensible justification and/or by measuring the monopoly's scope against 
that of the justification. 
• "Inevitable (or 'natural') monopoly":
This slippery term covers three distinct situations. Each generates "increasing returns 
to scale", which in turn allow the leading firm to seize and durably hold all or most of 
the market9. The first two situations give rise to "extreme scale economies" which a 
leading firm can exploit so that its supply curve maintains an abnormal downward 
slope as supply quantities increase, eventually assuring the leader near or complete 
sole-supplier status in the market.  The third situation involves instead an abnormal 
market demand curve, i.e. one which slopes upward rather than downward as supply 
quantities increase. This also gives the market-leading firm an opportunity to seize 
virtually the whole market.
-- "positive learning feedbacks":  In this situation, the superior skills of the
market leader improve faster than laggards can match as each expands its scale of 
operations, because skill acquisition is itself scale-dependent. Superior cost 
performance is effectively "self-reinforcing" with the firm's scale of operations, 
and so the biggest firm keeps enlarging its lead and takes the whole market.
-- "High start-up costs": Here, extraordinarily high launching costs for the 
market's product give the "first-mover"  an ever-descending cost (i.e. supply) 
curve. Market entry by new competitors never happens or encounters almost 
certain competitive failure. The classic example is a railroad service, where the 
costs of laying tracks and buying train cars is very high relative to the marginal 
costs of simply running more frequent back and forth journeys.
-- Network effects:  Here the market demand curve turns up rather than 
sloping down as the quantity supplied increases, because a user of the product 
derives value from others'  use of it. Here again, the "first entrant" to reach a 
"critical scale" will more than likely gain a big and durable measure of monopoly 
power. Classic examples are telephone and instant messaging services: each 
9
 A full understanding of "increasing returns" phenomena is a fairly recent achievement by economists.  
The seminal work is W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (1994).
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customer will value the right to use the service more highly the more users are 
hooked into the service.  The service provider with the most users will tend to 
attract more new users than its lagging competitors, at a much lower cost of 
marketing to them, and will therefore tend to take over the whole market.  A 
computer operating system also generates network effects (albeit indirectly), even 
when its end users are not connected to each other: the end users value a system 
more as more applications are available through it, and application suppliers will 
naturally "write to" the system with the most users.
The conventional policy response to an "inevitable monopoly" is acceptance –
because extreme scale economies and network effects themselves create lots of 
economic value. This acceptance is, however, often coupled with "regulation". 
Such regulation typically seeks to move the monopoly's price/quantity equation 
toward one resembling what pure competition would have delivered; but
regulation can of course also impose its own "deadweight" costs of bureaucratic 
delay and error.
• Cross-market monopoly leveraging: 
All the cases above deal with sources of monopoly power within a single market.  A firm
can also create monopoly power by "leveraging" established monopoly power from one 
market into a related market (i.e. one which buys from or sells to the first market, or 
whose product or service is complementary with the first).
Economists and antitrust scholars have long and heatedly debated the cross-market 
leveraging of monopoly power. 
Until the 1970's, U.S. antitrust doctrine was uniformly hostile to a leading firm in one 
market seeking, or appear to seek, a significant share of a related market, whether by
acquisition/merger activity, by deal ing exclusively with a firm in the related market, or
by "product tying" arrangements between the two markets' respective products10.
But the 1980's saw a strong counter-trend, led by the "Chicago School" of law and 
economics. The Chicago School argued that a monopolist in one market can generally 
maximize its profit by maintaining robust competition in all related markets: this will 
maximize overall demand for the initially monopolized product. The Chicagoans also 
stressed that firms often enter adjacent markets, and/or use exclusive deals or tying 
arrangements across markets, not to "leverage" monopoly power into the new market but 
simply to reduce their supply costs -- a clear efficiency enhancement -- or to practice an 
indirect form of price discrimination in the first market -- arguably a benign practice. 
Therefore, the Chicago School concluded, it is usually folly for policy to block cross-
10
 The classic, and highly critical, review of pre-1975 antitrust doctrines in these areas is Robert Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself 225-245 (rev. ed. 1993). 
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market mergers or discourage exclusive dealing or product tying practices by market 
leading firms11. 
Deferring to this reasoning, the courts and the Justice Department largely lost interest in 
cross-market monopoly power. Though few old cases or judicial doctrines were explicitly 
over-ruled, the entire area slipped in enforcement priority, and the tide of practical case 
decision moved toward leniency12.
More recently, however, many economists have counter-demonstrated that cross-market 
monopoly leveraging can be highly profit-maximizing under certain circumstances, e.g.: 
if the second market has characteristics of "inevitable monopoly", and/or the second 
market looks likely to obsolete the first, and/or the second market serves a significant 
number of customers who don't directly or indirectly use the first market's product13.
In the Information Industry, these "exceptional circumstances" happen all over the place, 
because the Industry is a hot bed of disruptive market-morphing and "inevitable
monopoly" markets.
The net result of all this scholarly debate has been an awkward legal muddle. 
Policymakers and the courts are beginning to recognize the importance of cross-market 
monopoly leveraging in the Industry, but they have at hand no well-worked legal or 
regulatory tools, or even concepts, to address it.
IV. A Diagnosis of Monopoly Power in the Industry
One can summarize all this welfare economics by defining four distinct monopoly power 
"ailments":
• Unjustified government monopoly grants – where a state grant of monopoly is 
excessive to the government's declared justification, or the justification is 
economically non-optimal.
11
 Regarding the Chicago School, see generally: Robert Bork, supra note 10, Richard Posner, The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979), E. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: a remembrance of 
law and economics at Chicago, 1932-70, 26 J.Law & Econ. 163 (1983).  Regarding Chicago School 
analysis of tying arrangements and other "vertical" restraints, see: Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and 
the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957), Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  
price fixing and market division (part 2), 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966), and Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason 
and the Economic Approach: reflections on the Sylvania decision, 45 U.Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977). 
12 See Robert Bork, supra note 10, at Epilogue, and Herbert Hovencamp, supra note 4, at 318, 385-386, 
389. 
13
 Jay P. Choi and Chris Stefandis, Tying, Investment, and Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32:1 Rand J.Econ. 
52-71 (2001). Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create 
Market Power in Evolving Industries, NBER Working Papers No. 6831 (2000). See generally: M.A. 
Lemley and D. McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Calif. L.Rev. 479 (1998); 
M.L. Katz and C. Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Amer.Econ.Rev. 424 
(1985); Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Laws in Schumpeterian Industries, 90:2 Amer.Econ.Rev. 192 
(2000). 
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• Unjustified horizontal combinations – where a cartel, joint venture or merger
generates allocational inefficiency by eliminating or reducing competition among its 
parties without generating enough operational scale economies (i.e. enough lowering 
of market supply costs) to off-set this deadweight loss.
• Poorly-addressed natural monopolies – where the state's "corrective" regulation of an 
inevitable monopoly is ineffective or over-broad, or imposes excessive bureaucratic 
costs.
• Cross-market monopoly leveraging – where a leading firm in one market uses
exclusive deals, or product tie-in's with a related market to leverage monopoly power 
into the second market, rather than merely to garner operational scale economies or to 
exercise price discrimination in the first market.
In practice, spotting any of these "ailments" with certainty is impossible; the exercise 
requires lots of judgment and, in the end, guesswork.  I will nevertheless proceed in this 
section to probe and poke at our patient, and report my diagnostic observations; in the 
following section, I will venture recommendations on policy treatments and cures.
A.  Government grants of monopoly
The federal government today regularly grants significant monopolies in two areas of the 
Industry: (a) the creation of "intellectual property rights" via grants of patent and 
copyright monopolies that restrict "non-rivalrous use" of poems and platforms, and (b) 
the creation of "frequency monopolies" by FCC allocations of the radio spectrum to 
private parties. 
Intellectual property protection influences competitive behavior chiefly in the Industry's 
authoring and publishing functions, while the radio spectrum monopolies chiefly affect 
the (wireless) distribution of information products. 
In both these cases, the monopolies are created by conferring exclusive private property 
rights over products or resources that would otherwise exist in a "commons", i.e. the 
"public domain".  Such "enclosure" actions are not typically viewed as "monopoly 
grants", but such – from a rigorously economic perspective -- they are. The welfare 
economic issue is whether the "enclosed monopolies", as designed, result in more or less 
"value added" than leaving the product or resource in a  commons or enclosing the 
commons in some fundamentally different way. 
1. Intellectual Property Protection 
Intellectual property rights flow from many statutes and common law doctrines.  I will 
focus here on the federal copyright and patent laws, as these shape all other sources of 
intellectual property protection in the Industry.
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Absent patent or copyright protection , a poem or platform would generate considerable
"value added" simply because its "non-rivalrous" use by a potential infinity of customers 
would entail only the costs of packaging the product temporarily (if necessary) in some 
tangible medium, distributing it, and actually finding the desired product in the haystack 
of all available poems and platforms.  The holder of an intellectual property right, 
however, enjoys the monopoly power to raise very significantly the product's price and 
lower the quantity supplied, profiting the right-holder but shrinking the "consumer 
surplus", and destroying a substantial amount of the value-added that would otherwise 
flow from the product's non-rivalrous use. Accordingly, a regime of copyrights and 
patents can be justified as a matter of economic efficiency only if it sufficiently increases
the creation of new poems and platforms, and/or so reduces customer search costs, as to 
offset the regime's inevitable destruction of non-rivalrous use value. 
The Nation's Founders appear to have embedded this  economic calculus in the U.S. 
Constitution's requirement that Congress create patents and copyrights only "[t]o promote 
the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries".14
To assess whether any given regime of intellectual property protection gets this calculus 
right, no reliable "quantitative" test exists (or likely ever will).  I believe strongly, 
however, that we today have the economic equation badly wrong: we are "over-granting"
intellectual property rights and in the process detracting significantly from the net value-
adding potential of information products.
This belief stems from two broad (and, I concede, "unprovable") observations:  first, the 
authoring and publishing functions could in theory work reasonably well with 
considerably less intelectual property protection  than we today confer; second, the
dramatic expansion in copyright and patent protection of recent years does not appear to 
have flowed from any reasoned economic analysis. 
The authoring and publishing functions do not require lavish intellectual property 
protection.
Even in a world without any copyright or patent protection, these functions would soldier 
on, though of course much transformed. Publishing would continue as a skinny "search 
engine" function, and authoring would continue as a "natural" human activity.  T here 
likely would be fewer new poems, publications, and platforms, at least of certain types –
e.g. expensive blockbuster-type movies, lavishly assembled multi-topic magazines and e -
zines, and perhaps (though this is very debatable) certain highly complex or specialized 
types of software programs.  On the other hand, the information products that did get 
authored would generate considerably more economic value than they do today, because 
they would be available for low cost "non-rivalrous" use by everyone.  
14
 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.
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The point here is not that a zero-protection world would be better than any other 
protection scenario but only that comparing the economic efficiency of different
conceivable regimes of intellectual property protection requires a complex balancing of 
conflicting economic effects.  One cannot simply assume, though many do, that more 
intellectual property protection results in more economic value-creation: this assumption 
confuses the monopoly profit harvestable by holders of intellectual property rights with 
the total economic value created under different regimes of intellectual property 
protection.
Publishing's basic function is to cut customer search costs, i.e. to help customers find the 
poems and platforms they want.  Most publishers (whether working in print or online) do 
this today by pre-selecting needles from the haystack of raw content, assembling these 
into edited packages ("publications"), and then branding and marketing the results, 
looking for profit by charging fees to customers for, and/or by selling ads on , the 
publications.  Absent copyright protection, however, the publications could be freely 
copied by competitors: the customer fees would wither, and the ad revenue would scatter 
in all directions.  So, if unprotected by copyright law, publishing as a commercial activity
might shrink down to a less costly search-help business, supported by such proprietary 
"competitive advantages" it could muster through skill, self-promotion, and technology 
under the limited protection of trade secret, trademark, and confidential information laws.  
I leave to the reader's imagination which new business models might arise and which old 
ones perish. The point is that the publishing function's "size", its total call upon the 
economy's resources, reflects the prevailing legal regime of intellectual property 
protection but does not itself indicate the economic merits of any particular regime of 
protection. 
The authoring function presents a different picture.  Without vigorous authoring, the pool 
of poems and platforms would be stagnant.  Therefore, authoring is the function most
often thought in need of thick intellectual property protection. This is presumably why 
patents and copyrights go initially to authors and why intellectual property rights are
defended chiefly as incentives for authors to create new poems and platforms15.
It is, however, very easy to over-estimate the financial incentive – the amount of
government conferred monopoly power -- that is required to assure vigorous and fruitful 
creative activity by authors.
Authoring, unlike publishing, or indeed most activities in commercial life, is a natural act
for human beings. To be blunt, we authors are as a class over-eager geese that can't help 
but lay eggs (some golden, many mainly lead) regardless of diet. Let authors be authors,
and they will, well, author.  Of course some won't, but there are lots of authors in the 
15 A focus on "author rights" can also be animated by a belief that authors have an extra-economic (or 
frankly non-economic) "moral" claim to their creations.  But American law, unlike European intellectual 
property law, does not recognize such "moral" rights.  Conversely, one can use a special deference to 
authors' interests to defend a larger realm for the "public domain" and a commensurately lesser role for 
intellectual property protection. Such reasoning underlies Professor Lessig's felicitous characterization of 
the public domain as a "creative commons". Lawrence Lessig, The Freedom of Ideas (2001).   
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world, at all levels of skill, for every conceivable genre of poem or platform. With the 
ever-descending cost of digital authoring tools (from word processing and spread sheet 
programs, through digital mini-cameras and music synthesizers to super-easy software
programming tools), the world-wide reservoir of authors is expanding rapidly and is ever 
more cheaply and swiftly accessible over the Internet to every publisher. 
I readily concede that wealthy patronage, from the Medicis' largesse through stock option 
grants from Microsoft, has brought forth information products of genius. But, with 
startling regularity, great paintings have also issued without financial sponsorship from 
windowless garrets, brilliant music from the meanest of streets and alleyways, and 
zillions of lines of impressive code from penniless hackers and networked teams of 
unpaid "open-source" software programmers.  Each year brings its new tide of high 
quality poetry, short stories, songs, unsolicited magazine articles and foreign reportage, 
documentaries, satirical animations, clever new computer operating systems, specialized 
software applications, etc. – for much of which there exists absolutely no commercial
audience.
Despite the Industry's sacred mantra that "content is king", new poems and platforms are
in truth scandalously cheap. Authors, being many in number and naturally prolific, 
simply don't cost very much. Industry firms generally have "R&D" or "editorial" budgets 
that constitute only 5-20% of their revenues, and much of this spending goes for routine 
tasks of editing, product testing, or technical support, not for core authoring16. Any close 
correlation between dollars spent on new content and an enterprise's competitive success 
is usually very difficult to establish.  
Put graphically, the "supply curve" for nearly any category of new poems and platforms 
is a horizontal line, extending to infinity, at a price near zero: supply everywhere exceeds 
demand.
This wonderful glut of new content does, however, require one critical nutrient: ready 
access to old content. "Culture" evolves and accumulates; it is not invented afresh with 
every stroke of innovation. Poems and platforms, even those of revolutionary novelty, are 
invariably built up from preceding ideas, models, components, influences, phrases, code 
sequences, etc. This means that lavish protection  of intellectual property is not merely 
inessential to the creation of new content but can actually impede it -- by blocking, 
delaying, or raising the costs of accessing old content. Intellectual property protection is 
subject to sharply diminishing marginal productivity in terms of stimulating more 
authoring – to the point where, in the extreme, the marginal productivity of the incentives 
turns negative because authors are overly restricted in their access to old content.
16Regarding R&D costs as a percentage of sales, see Raymond Wolfe (project director National Science 
Foundation, Division of Sciences Resources Statistics), Research and Development in Industry: 1999, NSF
02-312, Tables A-21-22 (2002).  Regarding Editorial costs as a percentage of sales, see [to come].
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Recent expansions of copyright and patent protection lack economic justification
The last quarter century has seen an unprecedented expansion in the scope and depth of 
U.S. copyright and patent monopolies17. It is obvious why the changes were thought good 
for established holders of copyrights and patents and for intellectual property lawyers, 
and sometimes (not always) why the changes were regarded as "linguistically logical" 
interpretations of various statutes and legal doctrines.  Why these changes were good for 
general economic value creation, however, remains a mystery – a mystery, I fear, 
incapable of solution.
(a.) Copyright 
A copyright protects its holder against unauthorized copying of the work, and of its 
"derivatives", for a fixed period. The core "infringing" conduct is "piracy", where 
competitors merely copy the original and distribute it for their own profit.  The scope of 
the monopoly has traditionally been disciplined by keeping the period of protection 
limited, and by two legal doctrines -- the distinction between uncopyrightable "ideas" and 
the protected "expression" of these ideas (a distinction that serves indirectly to limit the 
monopoly's coverage of "derivative" works authored by others), and the allowance of 
"fair use" of protected works for certain purposes in certain contexts.18
Congress made software programs copyrightable in 1980.19 This usefully made clear that 
wholesale pirating of programs for profit is unlawful.  Otherwise, however, copyright 
protection has been a mixed blessing for a field that was flourishing quite nicely without 
it.  In at least three respects the traditional framework of copyright law has proved at best 
an awkward fit for the unique character and authoring realities of software.  
• Uncertain scope of copyright protection:
A copyright holder need not declare herself such, much less clarify what aspects of a 
work the copyright protects, unless and until she brings an actual suit for infringement 
against a new work.  The resulting uncertainty facing authors of new works is 
multiplied for programmers because of the uniquely phased character of the software 
writing process.  In the first phase, someone – typically a business manager – writes a 
"functional specification" in lay language, outlining the marvelous new things the 
program should do for users.  Second, programmers convert this functional outline 
into a "technical specification" and, from it, author the new program in "source code", 
using a human-readable language such as C++, Java, BASIC, etc.  Nothing up to this 
point is "published"; it is all stowed away under lock and key and, typically, further 
17
 Patent protection has "thickened" chiefly from the activism of the Patent Office, heavily backed by the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which was created in 1982 and has proven far more "pro patent" 
than the normal federal appeals courts.  See generally Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (1994). By 
contrast, the thickening of copyright protection has been largely the product of new congressional 
legislation.  See generally Lessig, supra note 15, at 98, 106-107, 110, 196-197, 216, 264.
18
 For a good summary of these and other basic principles of copyright law, see Arthur R. Miller & Michael 
H. Davis, Intellectual Property 295-406 ( 3rd edition, 2000).
19
 17 U.S.C. sec. 117.
18
shrouded under the protection of state laws of "trade secret".  The source code is next 
"compiled" (by a standard computer program) into "object code".  This consists of 
long sequences of digits – 1's and 0's – that are directly understandable only by 
computers.  This object code is then licensed or sold to end users for revenue.  In the 
final phase, these users "execute" or run the object code and, one hopes, experience 
all manner of marvelous new capabilities. 
Now, what exactly does a "copyright" on the program protect?  The unpublished 
functional or technical specifications?  The unpublished source code?  Some 
sequences of digits from the object code and, if so, which sequences?  The "look and 
feel" of the ultimate user experience and, if so, what aspects of this experience?  No 
author of new programs can know any of this, because the exact scope of an 
outstanding copyright is decided by the peculiar facts and circumstances of each 
litigated case.20  As a result, the copyrightability of software has imposed a new and 
heavy "risk tax" on the Industry's basic engine of innovation.
This tax bites particularly hard in the software field. Though innovation in any 
discipline involves building on the past, the pull of history has an especially strong 
gravitational force in software:  it is the express and commercially necessary purpose 
of most new programs to outdo the efficiency or functionality of old programs but
also to work compatibly (i.e. "interoperate") with old ones.  It is therefore vital that a 
sharp line exist between what in the old is non-violable, as a disallowed "derivative"
version of the old, and what is allowable as genuinely new, involving only the re-use 
of "ideas" from the old.  Rather than such a bright line, copyright law presents the 
putative innovator with a near-random game of chance.    
• Near-perpetual duration of copyright protection: 
The commercially appealing life of a software program is very short – at most a few 
years.  Though old stuff often remains installed for much longer, no one makes a 
dime selling or licensing copies of it. By contrast, the duration of copyright protection 
is measured in multiples of decades.  Copyrights don't vanish or even weaken with 
the age or non-use of a work,21 and lobbying pressure from giant publishers of books, 
music, and movies has impelled the Congress repeatedly to stretch out the period of 
copyright protection.22 Copyright terms are now far longer than an author working in 
any medium or discipline could rationally find to be "incentivizing".23
20 See Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Lotus Corp. v. Borland International, 
Inc., 49 F3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affirmed 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 35 
F.3d. 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1184 (1995); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control 
Systems, Inc. 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).  See generally: Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and 
Copywrongs 112-114 (2001), and Alfred Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", Emory L.J. (1989), at 404-406. 
21
 For innovative ideas on this aspect of copyright law, see Justin Hughes, Fair Use Over Time, 50:3 UCLA 
L.Rev. 775 (2003).  
22
 The current duration of a copyright is the author's life plus 70 post-humous years, versus only 14 years 
(renewable for up to 14 more years during the author's life) in the Nation's first copyright status.  The 
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• Potential threats to software "re-engineering":
It has long been a common and accepted practice in the software industry to use 
lawfully-licensed "object code" to help a programmer guess at and "re-engineer" the 
basic logic of  an old program's secret "source code", so that the programmer can 
write a new, non-infringing program that outperforms the old one and/or interoperates
well with the old one. Such re-engineering, for technical reasons, requires repeated 
"copying" of the object code of the old program (though only for the new author's 
own use, not for "re-publishing" the old program). At the moment, bona fide "re-
engineering" projects are apparently still allowed under copyright law's "fair use" 
doctrine24. But there is considerable litigation in the area, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue, and it would not take much further "pro-copyright" doctrinal 
evolution to put the re-engineering of software effectively out of business.
• The technological and legislative "leapfrogging" of copyright law.
We are now witnessing a three-front war that threatens to bring down the basic 
structure of copyright law.  The first front was opened by "peer-to-peer file sharing", 
the ability of Internet-connected computers to share files directly with each other.25
The mass free sharing of copyrighted material is a flagrant (a "not fair use")
infringement of copyright law, but it's an open question whether judicial processes
alone can shut down such infringement. Opening a second front in the struggle, the 
Industry is beginning to roll out ever more sophisticated "digital rights management" 
(DRM) software that gives an author or publisher plenary control over whether and 
precisely how users can use or further distribute a work.26 The technological
protection afforded by DRM technology creates a monopoly via sheer physical 
possession that transcends the limited property concepts traditionally applied to 
published information products. Finally, opening front number three, Congress has 
now leaped into the fray to criminalize attempts to hack or disable DRM software, 
Congress has legislated 11 retroactive extensions of copyright's term in the last 40 years, versus two such 
extension's in the Republic's first 150 years. Lessig, supra note 15, at 107.
23
 Eldred v. Ashcroft,  537 U.S.____, ____ (2003)  [dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer].  Justice Breyer's 
mathematical demonstration that the most recent statutory extension of copyright terms cannot be rationally 
justified as an incentive to authors presumably did not rise to constitutional dimensions in the judgment of 
the Court's majority – but his argument seems to me unanswerable as a matter of economic logic and, 
therefore, as a guide to minimally responsible public policy.
24
 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Circ. 2000). See also Sega 
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1992). For an argument that reverse engineering should 
not be liberally allowed under copyright law,  see J. Vining, The Future of Computer Software in the 
Reverse Engineering War:  Excessive Protection v. Innovation, 67 Brooklyn L.Rev. 567 (2001).
25
 Peer-to- peer technology has a considerable heritage on the Internet, though its mass popularity is quite 
recent. See Nelson Minar and Marc Hedlund, A Network of Peers:  Peer-to Peer Models Throughout the 
History of the Internet, at 3-15 in Andy Oram (ed.), Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive
Technology (2001).
26
 For a brief explanation of DRM technologies, see Joshua Duhl and Susan Kevorkian, Understanding 
DRM Software Systems: An IDC White Paper (2001), accessible via http://www.intertrust.com. 
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thereby creating new law that also makes a hash of the fragile doctrinal balances that 
characterize copyright law.27
Who will prevail in this three-front war is anyone's guess; but, whatever the outcome,
the result won't be copyright law as we have known it; technology – in one way or 
another – either will have eroded the "physical" reality that information products are 
inherently "non-rivalrous" in use, or will have made that reality so potent as to defeat 
any legal limits on it.  In brief, entirely new forms of monopoly power, and new ways 
to undermine it, are swiftly clouding up the Industry's horizon.
(b.) Patents
The courts – upsetting prior rulings – have now authorized the patenting of software.28
Perhaps it was inevitable, and even logical, that patents should be recognized for software 
components of broader, machine-like inventions whose purposes lie outside those of the
Information Industry; machines have always been patentable, and their componentry is 
increasingly "soft" rather than mechanical or electro-mechanical.29 But for what I have 
here called "platforms" – software products that host or deliver poems or other platforms 
that do so -- patent protection is worse than unnecessary:
27
 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DCMA], 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a)(2).  See generally:  David 
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.Pa.L.Rev. 673 (2003); 
Symposium, Exploring Emerging Issues: New Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Security 
in Borderless Commerce:  The Anti-Circumvention Provision of the DMCA, 8 Tex.Wesleyan L.Rev. 593 
(2002). Initial court decisions under the DMCA have rejected constitutional objections to the Act's anti-
circumvention provisions (e.g.  objections that allege such provisions intrude on First Amendment rights or 
transcend Congress' power to legislate protection of intellectual property): Universal City Studios, Inc. v 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d. Cir. 2001);  U.S. v. Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1138-41 (N.D. Calif. 2002). 
The DCMA does direct the Librarian of Congress to conduct a review every three years of the Act's effects 
and authorizes the Registrar of Copyrights to exempt from the Act whole classes of works on which the Act
may be foreclosing use that is not an infringement of copyright law.  DCMA supra at sec. 1201(a)(1)(b) 
and (c). But the first such review resulted in no exemptions.  Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition 
on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies; Final Rule, 37 C.F.R. 
Part 201, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556-01. See also Nimmer supra at 693.  Similarly, the courts have permitted 
license terms embedded in so called "shrink wrap licenses" to go beyond the intellectual property 
protection provided by traditional copyright law.  Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996).
28
 State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 
U.S. 1093 (1999). The earlier view held that software was not patentable because it consisted merely of 
mathematical algorithms, analogous to unpatentable mathematical formulae and mental processes.  
Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
29
 The courts seemed to embraced this position in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), but have clearly 
now endorsed the patentability all software that produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result," regardless 
of being components of some larger complex or machine. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial 
Group, supra note 28, at 1373. 
21
• Unlike "machines", platforms are already amply covered by copyrights.  It is very 
odd, if not unprecedented, for an important class of products to qualify for both 
forms of monopoly protection.30  The software industry came into being and 
flourished for decades without this double-coverage. 
• Securing and defending against patents are enormously costly, time-consuming
activities: no other species of litigation is more complex, doctrinally arcane, and 
uncertain in its outcome.31 The advent of patenting has imposed a new "tax" and a 
big set of unfathomable risks, on innovation in general, and on new software 
ventures in particular, throughout the Industry.
• Though copyright law has often dealt awkwardly with the complex, multi-phase
process of software authoring ,32 the patent statute plainly misfits these realities.
-- Along with holding software to be patentable, the courts embraced the 
patentability of the "business methods" or business models that are typically 
reflected in the "functional specification" that initiates the software authoring 
process.33 These aspirational statements are usually mere ideas or wish lists, quite
obvious in their desirability, and therefore equally obvious to any savvy business 
person in the field; few of them even remotely fit the patent statute's requirements 
of "novelty" and "non-obviousness". Yet hundreds of these business method 
patents have now issued. This is just silliness: most of these patents will get 
invalidated if and when pursued to final litigated judgment, but that takes many 
months and millions of dollars in legal fees and risks for accused infringers.
-- Patent claims are also now often made and granted to cover the basic 
logic of the undisclosed source code from which the sellable or licensable 
program has been generated.  In effect, the patent filer gets the benefit of the 
statute's monopoly protection without meeting the statute's corollary obligation to 
make the patented matter public. This one-way street is of very doubtful legality 
and has no economic logic.
-- No "fair use" exception exists in the patent laws.  Therefore, users of 
patented software can arguably be barred from using duly licensed object code to 
"re-engineer" new software, even though the latter does not infringe the patent.  
This obstacle to re-engineering could cut off one of the Industry's primary 
avenues of new competitive entry into software markets.
• Like copyrights, patents can extend under certain circumstances to derivative
works, but the two statutes  use quite different definitions for derivative status.34
Only the rare expert on both statutory schemes can sort out the differences or 
30
 See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Columbia.L.Rev.
2432 (1994).
31
 The average cost of a patent suit has been estimated at $1.5 million per party.  Ian Mount, Would You 
Buy a Patent License From This Man?, eCompany (April 2001). 
32 Infra at          .
33
 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, supra note 28. See Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, State Street or Easy Street: Is Patenting Business Methods Good for Business?, 6 U.S. Int. 
Property: Law & Policy 277 (2000).
34
 See Reichman supra note 30.
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predict their possible interactions in litigation. This bonanza for lawyers creates 
another layer of cost and uncertainty for business innovation and 
entrepreneurship.
2. Radio spectrum monopolies
Since its inception, the Federal Communications Commission has been enclosing the 
natural commons of the radio spectrum into private monopoly franchises, allocating 
frequency usage exclusively to private companies, initially for radio stations, then for TV
stations, more recently for wireless communications companies. Allocations are done by 
regulatory fiat or, more recently, by outright auction.35 Most of these franchisees of 
course enjoy extremely high profit margins. The justification for creating these 
monopolies has been to avoid mutual signal interference. The progress of digital 
technology, however, is beginning to undercut this justification: with digital transceivers
and packectized data, many competing wireless networks can simultaneously co-use a 
slice of frequencies with little or no mutual interference.36 New wireless networks could
therefore develop in a much more robust competitive environment than did classic local 
and national radio and television broadcasting.37
B. Natural ("inevitable") monopolies
"Natural monopolies" are typically assumed to be both inevitable and productive of cost-
reducing or demand-enhancing social benefits, and "regulating" a natural monopoly after 
the fact in an economically efficient manner is very difficult. It is therefore important to 
diagnose alleged examples of "natural" monopoly power with some care. Otherwise one 
can too hastily conclude that natural monopoly is so pervasive in this Industry as to 
render the authoring, publishing and distribution of electronic information entirely 
unsuited to any form of "normal" government attention or control. In truth, the classic 
sources of natural monopoly -- i.e.: positive learning feedbacks, extraordinarily high 
product launch costs, and network effects. -- operate quite selectively in the industry.
One can of course argue that public policy should take small heed of monopoly power
throughout commerce, 38 but the Electronic Information Industry does not present  a 
"special case" in this regard.  
35
 See generally Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, FCC ET Docket No. 02-135 (Nov. 2002).
36 Ibid., at 13-14.
37
 See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward 
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 Federal Communications L.J. 561, 572-573 (2000).
38
 For instance, Joseph Schumpeter believed that "creative destruction"  has operated throughout the entire 
economy since the dawn of the industrial revolution, that monopoly power is necessary to fuel that process, 
and that conventional economics has therefore been generally misguided in opposing the formation of 
monopoly power by "private" (as opposed to state-assisted) forces. He was not in this regard distinguishing 
"natural" from "unnatural" sources of monopoly power; nor of course was he singling out the Electronic 
Information Industry for special treatment, as that industry was of very minor general economic importance 
in 1942. Schumpeter, supra note 3, at 89-90.
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1. Positive learning effects:
These no doubt occur, but there is reason to suspect this Industry may be less prone to 
them than are other lines of commerce. Because information products have short half-
lives, and creative destruction often overturns market boundaries, a firm must frequently 
learn entirely new tricks to survive and stay ahead of the game.  The large scale of an 
established market leader, however, typically proves an in stitutional obstacle to learning 
entirely new tricks.  The risk/reward financial balance for investing in possible new 
technologies and markets rarely "pencils out" for a successful market leader, because its 
loyal customers rarely understand or feel a need for the "new stuff".39  It is very striking, 
for instance, that established leaders have rarely led or come out on top of the many big 
new waves of innovation that have periodically transformed the Industry.40
2. High product launch costs:
Though "poems" hardly ever involve high launch costs, "platforms" (i.e. software 
products) and "distribution networks" often do, the former owing to "R&D" costs, the 
latter to the big upfront investment needed to build a physical network.  But the
monopoly-generating impacts of these high launch costs should not be exaggerated.
• Absent "network effects" – a phenomenon distinct from high launch costs --
expanding the sales and market share for a platform product or network requires 
non-trivial marginal marketing costs, and these costs will typically tilt a firm's 
supply curve upward long before the firm seizes the whole market.
• Writing new software is, like all authoring, cheaper than is commonly supposed.41
Further, given short software product half-lives, R&D costs for most software 
firms tend to be reasonably scale-variable, i.e. a continuous cost of on-going 
operations and normal growth, subject eventually to conventionally increasing 
marginal costs like most operating expenses. The prominent monopoly power that 
characterizes many platform markets is due far more to "network effects" than to 
high R&D launch costs.
• A new entrant can usually "rent" the capital equipment needed to build a network, 
or indeed rent unused network capacity from existing players, and so avoid 
massive launching costs.  I am aware of only two substantial cases of durable 
monopolies attributable to very high new network build costs – local copper wire 
phone networks and local cable TV systems.  These of course present the 
39 See Clayton M.Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, Ch. 4 (1997).
40
 For instance: Western Union dominated telegraphy but got nowhere in telephonic communications.  The 
big three broadcast TV networks played little role in the growth of cable TV systems or cable TV 
programming.  Cable systems firms have not led in satellite TV systems.  IBM dominated mainframe 
computing but ceded leadership in minicomputers to Digital Equipment Corporation and leadership in PC's 
to Intel, Microsoft, and Dell.  The mega-publishers of print newspapers and magazines were unable to 
capture the new world of web-based consumer portals.  On-line auctioning is led by e-Bay, not Sothebys or 
Christies. Digital communications equipment is dominated by Cisco, not Lucent or Nortel.
41 See infra  at        .
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notorious "last mile" problem, a genuine monopoly power conundrum in the 
Industry.  The national monopolies and oligopolies found in these two industry 
segments have, by contrast, generally been caused by mergers, not by
prohibitively high network building costs. Similarly, the oligopoly structure of 
national radio and TV broadcast networks resulted from merging or affiliating 
local monopoly franchises formed by government grants of exclusive spectrum 
use and were not attributable to prohibitively high network launch costs.
3. Network effects:
Powerful network effects do pervade the Industry's distribution function. That function, 
after all, consists chiefly of communications networks and/or of platform software, the 
former generating network effects by definition, the latter doing so indirectly by the 
interplay of end-user volume and the number of applications and poems hosted by the 
platform in question.  
These pervasive network effects, however, do not "inevitably" lead to monopoly power.  
That step requires, in addition, that the "connection standards" between communications
networks, or between software platforms and the third party applications or service which 
they host, be "proprietary" (i.e. "closed").  When such standards are instead "open and 
free of charge", the network effects still exist, indeed are much magnified, but no single 
vendor can "internalize" them: each vendor's market share therefore depends in 
conventional competitive fashion on the relative superiority of its particular product's 
quality and features and  cost structure in supplying that product. If access is "open" 
except for a non-discriminatory fee, some internalization occurs (due to the fee), but 
cross-market leveraging of monopoly power become very difficult. It is the "standards 
regime" that explains why some of the Industry's distribution markets display 
considerable monopoly power (e.g. the markets for PC operating systems, online media 
players, video game platforms, and instant messaging), while others are savagely 
competitive (e.g. the markets for long-distance voice communications, the markets for 
supplying "open source" software "distributions", and nearly the entire "Internet
standards"-based domains of communications and applications hosting). Network effects 
are a "natural" feature of all these distribution markets, but monopoly power is not: 
monopoly power is instead the result of "closed standards".
4. Bottom line:
Durable and significant monopoly power can be largely traced to forces of "natural" 
monopoly in only two distribution function areas: local (i.e. "last mile") fixed-line 
networks, and the general absence of  "open" connection standards between competing 
networks and between primary platforms and third parties that provide applications, 
content, and services via such platforms .  How to solve the last mile problem, and how 
best to promote open standards, are therefore very prominent challenges facing public 
policymakers. These are indeed knotty problems, but the Industry as a whole is not
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"naturally" or "inevitably" monopolistic.  This is not an industry that "inherently" 
requires either pervasive government intervention or none at all.
C. Horizontal combination
Labeling a combination of firms "horizontal", rather than "vertical" (or otherwise "cross-
market"), depends entirely on how one draws market boundaries.  For simplicity of 
exposition, I will here classify as "horizontal" those combinations that unite several 
publishing (i.e. "content") properties or that unite products within a single distribution 
technology or "mode", and will assign all others to the "cross-market" category. Using 
that (concededly arbitrary) classification, my overall conclusion is that horizontal 
mergers and joint ventures in the Industry, while legion in number, usually carry neither 
significant harm nor significant benefits for economic efficiency.  The big exceptions to 
this comforting conclusion are "nationalizing" mergers of telecommunications, cable, or 
broadcasting networks.
Horizontal "publishing" combinations involving newspapers, book imprints, and/or 
magazines were common long before the same trend swept across movie, music, TV 
programming, and e-zines.  These mogul-making combinations always promise huge 
"synergies" of overhead cost reduction and cross-marketing prowess, and simultaneously 
draw cries of alarm from defenders of "content diversity".  In the end, however, the 
synergies typically prove  elusive, or are swamped by the enhanced diseconomies of 
managing added complexity, and content diversity emerges largely unscathed.  These 
mergers, and the "media empires" they build, seem to come apart about as frequently as 
new examples emerge. Content-amassing mega-mergers are more hype than substance 
for a simple reason: monopoly power in publishing is largely due to branding (i.e. to the 
content selection and marketing skills required to create and sustain a brand), and 
successful brands typically attach to discrete information products, not to the publishing 
enterprises that may own the brands.  Brand marketing is itself an element of normal
"competitive superiority", and brand leadership is in any case usually transient, because it 
can be eroded at fairly low upfront costs by skillful new entrants. Marketing – the crux of 
the "publishing" function – is, after all, largely a volume-variable expense. Simply 
combining lots of brands under one corporate roof does not substantially alter those 
fundamental realities.  So, media mega-mergers – as a generalization -- amount to much 
ado about quite little from an economic point of view.
Combination activity within a distribution mode or technology presents a more complex 
picture.
Turning first to software platform markets, few of these owe the monopoly power they 
may contain to merger activity.  It has been, for instance, rare to see mergers among 
different brands of operating system, or different brands of web media players, or of 
different brands of database software systems, etc. Software mergers have typically been 
among non-leaders, in usually vain efforts to defend against the market's leader's steadily 
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escalating market share, e.g. IBM's merger with Lotus (defending against Microsoft's 
lead position in PC application software) or Oracle's attempt at merging with Peoplesoft 
(to counter SAP's lead in enterprise resource planning software).   The monopoly power 
in each such market usually has arisen instead from one company's unilateral success in 
using proprietary application protocol interfaces (i.e. "closed" standards) to appropriate 
the network effects that naturally infect the particular market.  
In the area of telecommunications networks, TV/radio broadcasting networks, and cable 
system networks, by contrast, combination activity has had a substantial impact on 
Industry economics.  
As a first step, "consolidating acquisitions" were commonly used to build regional 
monopolies from the more localized community or neighborhood monopolies that 
emerged because of the high upfront costs required to erect a network infrastructure. The 
regional consolidating mergers did typically generate real operating cost reductions but 
also significantly raised the new entry bar for potential local competitors.  The cost 
reductions probably outweighed the new entry barriers, but one can't easily generalize: 
assessing the net value creation of regional-level consolidating acquisitions typically 
requires detailed case by case analysis – hardly the business of this article.
The second step -- linking together these regional monopolies into national (and 
occasionally international) networks -- presents a different economic calculus. Most 
national network markets are now characterized by quite tight oligopoly structures; and 
these structures are indeed usually traceable to the merging of regional monopoly 
networks. This national-level merger activity has probably produced some operational 
cost efficiencies (e.g. in billing and other back-office systems), but also no doubt also 
some scale diseconomies in managing complexity. The really big "cost reductions"
flowing from nationalizing mergers, and the chief (though usually unspoken) motive for 
them, is the very considerable "monopsony power" they create vis a vis network 
equipment, value-added network service, and content publishing suppliers to the merged 
entities. These cost reductions do not constitute efficiency gains for the overall economy.  
Monopsony power over suppliers leads to allocational inefficiency in the broader 
economy, just as does monopoly power exercised vis-a-vis customers.42 Further, such 
monopsony power usually stimulates defensive horizontal merger activity among its
victims. Consequently, nationalizing mergers of electronic distribution networks 
constitute an economic policy issue of considerable importance .
Cross-market (or "vertical") mergers raise a whole new set of policy issues.  But these are 
the same issues raised by unilateral efforts to leverage monopoly power across market 
boundaries via tying arrangements and exclusive dealing practices; so we turn directly to 
the root phenomenon of cross-market leveraging of monopoly power.  
D. The cross-market leveraging of monopoly power
42
 Herbert Hovencamp, supra note 4, at 13-16.
27
A successful cross-market leveraging of monopoly power creates a second monopoly.  
This is unfortunate – but that new monopoly will often occur anyway, simply because the 
new market is full of network effects and closed standards. The real vice of monopoly 
leveraging, therefore, is that it threatens the dynamic competitive process of "creative 
destruction" – the disruptive obsoleting of established products and markets by entirely 
new ones. Leveraging permits a single company to control the pace and shaping of new
market formation and evolution. The economic value created by "untamed" creative 
destruction is not readily quantified or graphed.  That is why economists have 
traditionally been uncomfortable addressing it. But permitting a single firm to control the 
process -- to subordinate the course of creative destruction to the firm's own profit-
making interests -- surely deprives the Industry of some of its long term potential to 
create value for the general economy.  To detect and "measure" this deprivation would 
require writing complete "alternative histories" for the affected Industry markets – an 
intriguing but inherently speculative exercise.  Still, it is hardly idle speculation to 
conclude that ceding the authorship of history to a monopolist is in general bad for 
economic value creation.    
That said, actually spotting significant instances of the cross-market leveraging of 
monopoly power requires considerable caution.  The vice cannot occur unless its alleged 
"perpetrator" possesses significant monopoly power in one market and uses that power as 
a unique (i.e. not duplicable) competitive asset ( e.g. not just as a source of financial 
funding) to achieve monopoly power in a related market. Further, this does not 
necessarily require competing directly in the related market: in certain cases, dealing 
exclusively with an existing player in that market can do the trick.  On the other hand, 
merely entering the related market, via internal product diversification or via merger, 
does not itself constitute leveraging.  Such entry must be accompanied either by 
exclusive self-dealing or by tying together the firm's two products for exclusive joint sale; 
further, these steps must not be undertaken merely to reduce the firm's normal operating
costs in serving two markets simultaneously, which is a normal and acceptable tactic that 
enhances overall economic efficiency, or merely to exercise indirect price discrimination 
in the first market, which is not clearly a bad thing from an economic point of view.43
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 Price discrimination enables a monopolist to convert a market's "consumer surplus" into monopoly 
profits.  This is obviously resented by consumers.  However, this conversion of consumer surplus into 
profit will also induce the monopolist to maximize her profits by supplying the same quantity of her 
product as a competitive market would supply, and therefore leads her to provide to the general economy 
the same "added value" as in the competitive case.  So, from the distribution-neutral perspective of welfare 
economics, a perfectly price-discriminating monopoly is no less "efficient" than a perfectly competitive 
market model that involves the same cost of supply mathematics.  Those opposing price discrimination 
purely on economic efficiency grounds therefore must ground their argument on the undeniable extra 
transaction costs involved in actually accomplishing price discrimination. When the price discrimination is 
accomplished via a forced inter-product tying scheme, a policy-maker might also postulate that consumers 
do not understand the full "after sale" costs they incur in buying that product; this defect in consumer 
understanding is a market imperfection in itself, though one best analyzed in terms of "deceptive practices" 
rather than as an instance of "cross-market monopoly leveraging". Such deceptive practices are arguably 
objectionable even if the "monopoly" in the tying product is itself non-objectionable because it is merely an 
instance of "brand-specific" monopoly power within a competitive inter-brand market.  All these subtle and 
slippery considerations (and more) got themselves confusingly entangled in the Supreme Court's most 
noteworthy, or notorious, modern decision on inter-market tying arrangements, Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
28
Taking account of all these caveats, it nonetheless is fairly easy to discern where the 
cross-market leveraging of monopoly power today poses significant problems in the 
Industry.  
1. Leveraging monopoly power from distribution markets into publishing markets
Prominent combinations between distribution and publishing  markets have occurred in 
cable and broadcast television (i.e. common ownership of  broadcast networks and 
television program producers and of cable systems networks and cable content channels), 
in Microsoft's repeated efforts to develop "content" franchises for its platform software
products (e.g.CDRom encyclopedias,  PC-based educational and entertainment titles, 
games for its X-box video game platform, and proprietary content-rich channels within 
its MSN web service), in AOL's signature marriage of ISP service and proprietary Web 
content, and in AOL/Time Warner's marriage of myriad content franchises with both an 
ISP network and cable  system services. The Industry has also begun seeing multiple 
music and movie publishers band together for joint ownership of "industry-wide portals" 
for Internet distribution of their digitized content, e.g. _____ and _____ for music 
distribution and movielink.com for video distribution.  These initiatives combine the 
creation of potential monopoly power, though the act of co-ownership, with the 
simultaneous leveraging of this "cartel" power into a new distribution market. 44
The exclusive yoking together of distribution and publishing has indeed become a 
strategic fad throughout the Industry. For distribution companies, the stated business 
strategy rationale for capturing exclusive content is to "discriminate" a distributor's core 
products from its competitors.  For content publishers, the rationale is to secure access to 
evermore concentrated electronic distribution channels. The practical effect all around, 
however, is to deprive new-entry publishers of distribution channels, to raise barriers to 
the independent, entrepreneurial development of new distribution technologies, and to 
encourage defensive consolidation among both distribution companies and publishing 
companies. One can imagine a "worst case" scenario where electronic information 
distribution and publishing become vertically integrated around a small number of very 
large oligopolies.  An Industry with this profile would harbor considerably more 
monopoly power, in many more markets, than is evident today: the Industry would suffer 
Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). See generally: C. Shapiro, Aftermarkets and 
Consumer Welfare:  Making Sense of Kodak, 63 Antitrust L.J. 483 (1995); Herbert Hovencamp, Market 
Power in Aftermarkets:  Antitrust Policy and Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L.Rev. 1447 (1993); B. Klein, Market 
Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 Sup.Ct.Econ.Rev. 43 (1993).   
44
 The potential for leveraging monopoly power across distribution and publishing market boundaries 
became a very prominent issue recently in debates about the acquisition of Time Warner by AOL.  See e.g. 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time 
Warner Merger, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J.  (2001). Similar monopolizing potential arises whenever multiple 
vendors joint to launch and own a so-called "B-2-B" e-commerce portal.  See generally Federal Trade 
Commission, Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplace, 
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), Para. 50, 176 (2000); Garen Gotfredson, B2B Internet Purchasing Exchanges: 
The Promises and Antitrust Risks of a New e-Commerce Platform, 2 Minn. Intell. Property Rev. 107 
(2001).
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a significant choking off of "unpredictable" creative destruction in both publishing and 
distribution.
2. Leveraging monopoly power across different "modes" of networked distribution
One frequently sees an established distribution network move into a new mode of
distribution, e.g. where a telephone network company adds a cellular phone service or a
cable television system service, or a cable system provides  voice communications or ISP
services.  These moves are attempts to anticipate shifts in customer preferences from one 
distribution mode to another, or to attract customers who want a single supplier for their 
various distribution needs.  It is difficult to fault these motives or to deny to customers 
the convenience sometimes brought by such diversifying moves.  Nor do such moves 
directly foreclose to independent distribution network services the means of reaching 
their intended customers. But, if the various distribution modes each has strong elements 
of "natural monopoly," a "single supplier" solution could end up facing many customers 
with a totally monopolized distribution universe.  That is the conundrum which we must 
re-address in considering policy responses.
3. Leveraging monopoly power across types of software platform
This is of course the core "Microsoft problem" -- because cross-market leveraging of 
monopoly power quite obviously constitutes that Company's core business strategy.45
Microsoft enjoys a near total monopoly in desktop operating systems and applications
and has sought with skill and relentless energy to leverage those two unique assets into 
securing monopoly power in almost every (even remotely) related software platform, 
from server operating and data base management systems and server-based applications 
through non-PC client-device operating systems, every conceivable web-based software 
platform, web portals, and now the evolving architecture for all so-called "web services".  
This strategy is the best way for Microsoft simultaneously to defend /prolong its desktop 
monopoly against intrusion by new platforms and to grow swiftly and dominantly in 
emerging new markets, maximizing growth in the Company's revenues and profits.  Were 
Microsoft not to pursue this logical business strategy would arguably breach its fiduciary 
duty to shareholders.  Were public policy to permit such a strategy to succeed, however, 
would threaten the entire process of creative destruction throughout much of the 
Electronic Information Industry, with incalculable negative consequences for the 
Industry's economic value-added.
This particular clash between private strategic logic and Industry-level value creation is 
hardly unique to Microsoft.  All software platforms generate indirect network effects, and 
the prevalence of "proprietary" connection standards in the Industry translates those 
effects into monopoly power for any leader in any software platform market. Every 
software company skillful, fast, or lucky enough to gain such monopoly power in one 
market seeks to leverage it into related platform markets.  That is indeed "the name of the 
game" throughout the entire software industry; software companies all seek to become 
the "industry standard" platform in their particular market and then try to leverage that 
45
 Regarding Microsoft's overall business strategy, see David Bank, Breaking Windows (2001).
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monopoly position into ancillary software markets.  Superior technology, marketing, 
branding, etc. are not irrelevant factors in the equation, but "home run" profit margins and 
revenue growth rates depend on the added factor of monopoly leveraging.  This added 
factor can be removed only by the advent of open connection standards among software 
platforms  or rigorous legal restrictions on the practice of cross-platform monopoly 
leveraging.
V. Policy Cures 
The Industry's monopoly power "ailments" have no single source and therefore no single 
cure.  On the other hand, economic value creation would hardly be served by endless 
"case by case" court rulings and micro-managing regulatory interventions.  This would 
mean continuous, unpredictable, and intrusive government tinkering, at a huge cost in 
Industry time, money, management attention, and business certainty.  The objective, after 
all, is to liberate the Industry for maximum economic value creation, not to convert it into 
a laboratory for legal experimentation.  
The better approach is to focus on the most significant sources of Industry monopoly 
power and to address each with a minimal number of reasonably simple, "bright line" 
rules of structure or conduct.  Such rules can do no better than very rough justice, but 
they can at least free most Industry resources to maximize economic value.
In this spirit, I offer here some highly immodest policy recommendations, proceeding 
again through the four sources of troublesome monopoly power.  The reader will notice 
that I have not let "political doability" enter at all into the recommendations. Instead I 
have put premiums on economic logic and simplicity (goals which are themselves hard 
enough to balance and combine).  
A. Government grants of monopoly
1. Intellectual Property
The diagnosis above itemized the many value-reducing effects of recent trends in 
intellectual property law.  This diagnosis counsel s reform in three  main areas.
• Copyright law should reverse its trend toward ever-increasing "protection", 
especially as regards software. This means reverting to much shorter copyright 
terms, narrowing protection for "derivative works", reviving a more robust 
domain for unprotected "ideas" (versus protected "expression"), and giving the 
"fair use" exception ample breathing room.  I frankly despair of meaningful
progress on any of these fronts.  In the interim, however, Congress and the 
Supreme Court could at least give the Industry's innovative engines a boost by 
clearly freeing normal software "re-engineering" projects from copyright 
harassment.
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• Congress should simply terminate patent protection of Industry software 
platforms. Leave this whole area to copyright law, and reserve patent protection 
solely for software components that are integral to "machines" whose uses lie
outside the boundaries of the Industry. Some observers have urged instead a 
nuanced, if complex, judicial re-tweaking of various patent doctrines as these 
apply to software;46 this would clearly help – but I fear it is no more likely, and 
would prove far more time consuming, than a single cleansing stroke by the 
Congress.
• Finally, Congress should retreat from the multi-front technology war that pits new 
DRM systems against peer-to-peer file sharing and the guerilla hackers who bore 
their way into DRM systems. Simply declare neutrality and get out of the way. No 
one can possibly predict who will, or should, win how much territory in this war .
All of the combatants are disregarding the delicate balance of rights and interests 
that has evolved over centuries of copyright law evolution.  (My own guess is that
the overwhelming commercial needs of on-line publishers will impel powerful 
platform companies and network distributors to devise and deploy DRM systems
that stay several steps ahead of the file sharers and hackers. But anyone's guess is 
just as good.) By keeping to the sidelines for now, the law can preserve its
credibility until wisdom catches up with the unpredictable trajectory of this arms 
race.  If one insists on a less agnostic stance than this, laws against the hacking of 
DRM systems should at least leave unprotected those systems that themselves
simply erase the main features of traditional copyright law, e.g. allowance for the 
"fair use" of published poems and platforms, the ability to re-engineer DRM-
protected software, and the clear right to use the "ideas" embodied in the DRM-
shrouded content.  Emerging DRM technologies are sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate these historic "content user" rights. Congress should limit its favor 
to DRM systems that achieve such flexibility. 
2. Radio spectrum monopolies
The FCC should as quickly as possible permit new digital transceiver technologies to co-
use spectrum resources as a "commons".  This would greatly accelerate the evolution of 
new digital networks which, unlike traditional radio and TV broadcasting, could grow in 
a robustly competitive environment.  The FCC would have to retain a role in "certifying" 
the non-interfering character of the new transceiver technologies, but this is a far simpler 
and less intrusive task than the complex rulemaking and adjudication that govern 
broadcasting and cable TV. 
B.  Natural ("inevitable") monopoly power
46
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The diagnosis narrowed down the "natural monopoly" phenomenon chiefly to two big
problems for law and policy:  the "last mile" dilemma, and the Industry's lack of "open" 
standards for connecting together distribution networks, different kinds of software 
platform products, and platforms with publications and poems.  
1. The last mile problem
The last mile in the U.S. is an arena for competing copper-wire DSL and cable-based 
technologies for "broadband" access to the Internet.  Neither technology provides a 
technologically optimal solution.  Several Asian countries are using various direct
government subsidies and investment programs to deploy last mile broadband 
capabilities, including optic fiber.47 Fiber is indeed the optimal solution, and these nations 
may quickly leapfrog the US in mass consumer and business usage of robustly broadband 
Internet content and services. 
Perhaps the cost of fiber-laying can be somewhat mitigated by supplemental use of new 
wireless networking technologies (e.g. fiber to the "structure" or "neighborhood" and 
wireless access the rest of the way).  But two realities would remain: laying the necessary 
local fiber will require massive investment, and the result will substantially obsolete
today's copper wire telephone networks and head-end-centric cable TV  networks.
Therefore, neither of those elements of the Industry is likely to undertake extensive last 
mile fiber investment, at least anytime soon. Their shareholders and creditors would 
refuse to finance such a self-cannibalizing, if far-sighted, project.  Nor is any private 
company or consortium likely to do so absent either a very big public subsidy or a 
government guarantee of plenary, long-duration monopoly power over the resulting fiber 
networks.
Between the alternatives of subsidy and state-granted monopoly, the first would be better
for the economy.  The whole point of achieving widespread broadband access is to 
provide a really fast highway to every information source, and every other 
communication network and service, for the nation's households and businesses.  Plenary 
private control over access to third party services and content providers would defeat the 
whole reason to undertake the project. The project's capacity to create value for the 
general economy would remain substantially under-tapped for a long time.  Better to wait 
until the public funds are available through traditional democratic processes (however 
economically "sub-optimal" these can be) than to botch the basic  job.
2. Promotion of open standards
47
 On the use of direct government subsidies to promote "last mile" broadband access, see e.g. Jeunsong 
An, E-Korea DSL Policy:  Implications for the United States, J. Marshall J. Computer & Information Law
421 (2002).
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The Industry's chief mechanisms of monopoly power are "closed standards" for linking 
together directly competing communications networks and for linking third party 
applications to networks or to software platforms.  A closed standard permits one 
network or platform to "enclose" (i.e. privatize) all or most of the network effects 
inherent in the particular market and thereby to gain a durably dominant market share.  A 
closed standard also enables a market-leading network or platform to leverage its 
dominance into adjacent applications markets, and – where those adjacent markets also 
are characterized by network effects – such leveraging becomes a plainly profitable 
strategy.
Therefore, public policy should champion "open standards".  The questions for policy are 
what kind of openness and how government should promote its adoption.
There are two basic genres of openness: paid and free.  In both cases, the market adopts a 
single, non-discriminatory connection standard for competing networks or for application 
access to competing platforms. This eliminates the wasted effort on all sides to write, 
maintain, and utilize multiple connection methods, and non-discrimination defeats efforts 
to leverage monopoly power into applications markets.  
A regulated access or license fee  for using the open standard is appropriate either where 
free access would create an "overload" problem (the so-called "tragedy of the commons") 
or where competitors need a fee payment at some level (in effect a limited "monopoly 
profit") to incent "optimal" build-out of the entire market's network or platform capacity 
or functionality (the fee acting to eliminate the so-called "free rider" problem").  A fee-
based standard is generally appropriate for connecting directly competing 
communications networks, because overload and free-riding are typical phenomena in 
such cases.  Setting and policing the fee structure presents difficult technical and 
administrative issues for policymakers, but these are typically more manageable than 
instead focusing on regulation of the end-user fees that a "full monopolist" can "fairly" 
charge to its ultimate customers.
A "free" standard is, by contrast, generally appropriate for connecting third party 
applications to a dominant network or platform.  Overload problems are much rarer in 
such cases, and neither platforms nor applications suffer from "free riding" effects by 
maximum applications access to all platforms.  Such access instead enhances private 
value creation on all sides the equation.
Of course, dominant network and platform owners will strongly resist government 
promotion of open standards, claiming that such standards "rob" them of their 
"intellectual property" or their "core technologies".  These arguments typically lack merit. 
Intellectual property protection is itself a government-granted privilege under U.S. 
constitutional law, not a dictate of "natural justice".  And connection standards rarely 
require much "technology": they are usually very minor and mundane hunks of computer 
code.  Their importance in the Industry is purely financial: they permit privatization of a 
market's inherent network effects.  Government has no "obligation" to allow, much less 
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to facilitate, such privatization, any more than government is obliged to permit or 
facilitate cartelization of a market by agreements among its competing vendors.  
There remains the hardly trivial dilemma of how public policy can best promote the 
evolution of open standards in the Industry.  Open standards are scarce here not because 
Industry firms are "selfish and greedy": all firms in every industry are selfish and greedy.
The basic obstacle to open standards in the Industry's is swift technological progress: 
connection standards require continuous tweaking to keep up with the technological 
innovation that continuously reshapes the Industry's products. A single firm can typically 
stay ahead of this curve of constant change much more easily than can a neutral 
committee of experts or a government regulatory body.  
Still, there do exist impressive examples of successful "open " connection standards, e.g. 
the "universal ports" that now connect PC's to peripheral devices, the spreading domain 
of Internet standards and protocols, the application program interfaces of "open source" 
software products such as the Linux operating system and the Apache web server, and the 
communications protocols used by most mobile phone companies outside the United 
States.
The government can try to advance open standards "case by case" by bringing antitrust 
actions against particular networks or software platforms that have achieved and abused 
overwhelming monopoly power.  But that is a slow, intrusive, and expensive approach to 
so pervasive a problem.
I would instead counsel resort to four more general avenues of reform:
• Government should more aggressively support ve ndor-neutral committees of 
standards experts – support expressed by government procurement policies for 
free open standards, by explicit government endorsement of expert committee 
recommendations, and also, if selectively, by outright subsidization of the 
committees.  There is of course a risk that the government and the committees 
will too quickly settle on technically "sub-optimal" standards.  But getting some
standard in place quickly almost always generates more economic value than does 
lengthy inter-vendor haggling and game playing in pursuit of the ever-elusive 
"optimal" standard.
• Government should, by new legislation, simply deny intellectual property 
protection to "third party" connection standards for applications access to
software platforms and communications networks.  
• Government similarly should withhold or withdraw intellectual property
protection from entire products and services whose owners refuse to publish, keep 
up-to-date, and fairly administer (at least) for-fee open connection standards for 
"third party" users.
35
• Government should cheerlead  "open source" software projects.48  These go 
beyond "open standards" to liberate entire products from private ownership.  
There is little risk of or need for placing the entire software industry into the 
public domain! But open source products do help discipline the pricing and 
behavior of their private competitors and greatly expand the range of consumer 
choice.
C. Horizontal combination
The main problem here is the merging of  regional monopolies into national networks in 
radio/TV broadcasting, cable systems, and telecommunications services. These
nationalizing mergers are worrisome chiefly because they create monopsony power vis a 
vis the resulting national networks' suppliers, i.e. network equipment companies, 
providers of value added network services, and – most consequentially – content 
publishers.  I believe the Justice Department and the FCC have failed to take this 
monopsony threat sufficiently into account in considering such mergers, e.g. those that:
• originally created the national broadcasting networks
• created the huge Time Warner and Comcast cable systems companies
• have shrunk drastically the number of RBOC's
• may soon attend the extension of the RBOC's into nationwide long distance 
telecommunications services
• will create a higher national market share for already-formed national TV and 
radio broadcasting networks under recently liberalized FCC regulations.49
In all these cases, debate focused on the consumer or editorial diversity impacts of the 
nationalizing merger trend.  There are decent arguments on both sides of that debate, but 
there seems to me little doubt that these mergers have all increased significantly the 
monopsony power of the resulting networks on all their "suppliers" – and most 
consequentially on their suppliers of content programming and related value-added 
services.
No significant innovation in prevailing antitrust doctrine is needed to address this threat:  
the benchmarks governing horizontal mergers and joint ventures are among antitrust 
law's few areas of relative clarity and sophisticated detail50 and the law has long 
recognized monopsony and monopoly power as equivalent vices. I concede, however,
that the cat is largely out of the bag as to the formation of these large national networks.  I 
48
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will therefore simply note that the resulting monopsony threat gives added force to the 
immodest  recommendations offered below regarding the cross-market leveraging of 
monopoly power.
D. The cross-market leveraging of monopoly power
As noted above, leveraging monopoly power into related markets is a core strategy for 
most software platform companies and, increasingly, for large distribution and publishing 
companies peering uneasily across the basic "functional" market boundary that separates
them.  
Leveraging is a baleful practice because it permits companies to "privatize" the otherwise
discourteously disruptive process of creative destruction by which the Industry spawns 
revolutionary new distribution technologies and content publishing models that exploit 
these technologies.
Leveraging "works" in this Industry because so many of its distribution markets produce 
network effects, which the Industry's shortage of "open" standards permits companies to 
convert into monopoly positions.  The leveraging problem would largely vanish if open 
standards were prevalent across the Industry – but such is not yet the case.
The current legal framework for cross-market leveraging is a muddle: weak and 
indifferently enforced vertical merger guidelines, and unsettled and confusing antitrust 
doctrines applicable to exclusive and preferential dealing, product tying arrangements, 
and attempts to monopolize new markets51 – the typical tactics of leveraging.  The whole 
51 Unfortunately, the Microsoft antitrust litigation in the U.S. and Europe has not, at least as yet, moved the 
law on monopoly leveraging toward greater simplicity and clarity.  In two respects, the ruling opinion of 
the D.C. Court of Appeals has instead created yet new complexities:  
• The Court drew a labored distinction between illegally defending a monopoly in the base market 
and illegally seeking like monopoly power in the related market, U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 
81-84 (2001), though both occurred here simultaneously by using  the same cross-market 
leveraging tactics (e.g. exclusive dealing and product tie-in's), in service to a single business 
strategy.  Apparently the second offense, but not the first, requires that the government define the 
related market.  The reason for this difference is a mystery, at least to this observer.
• The Court held that product tie-in's in the "software industry" should be litigated case-by-case 
under the "Rule of Reason", involving an unstated number of "balancing factors", rather than the 
"per se" rules that remain applicable in other industries.  This, the Court said, is because software 
is a new and technological complicated industry. Ibid. at 94-96. In fact, the relevant economics of 
the software business are not complicated: software markets are marked by the coincidence of 
closed standards and network effects, which makes the emergence of monopoly power nearly 
"inevitable" and makes its cross-market leveraging highly profitable. Litigating these economic 
realities de novo, case by case, will prove a waste of everyone's time and make the practical 
conduct of software businesses unnecessarily costly and uncertain.
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field needs a thorough legal re-vamping, aimed at establishing a few "bright line" rules 
that could significantly retard the Industry's strong leveraging tendencies. I will here 
suggest three immodest recommendations for doctrinal reform, freely conceding that 
each would need extensive detail work.     
• We should effectively ban -- where needed via legislation -- the vertical 
integration of distribution and publishing in the Electronic Information Industry.
This would with a single stroke free up different distribution modes and platform 
products to compete on their own merits,  liberate publishing generally from 
distribution barriers to entry, assure healthy growth of new publishing brands and
products, and obviate the felt need for "defensive" consolidations in publishing.
• Antitrust law should recognize a very strong, if case-by- case rebuttable, 
presumption that dominant market players may not deploy long-term exclusive or 
self-preferential deals or product tie-in's between distinct platform markets or
between technologically distinct networking modes.  Such a rule would permit 
distributors to enter unilaterally (though not typically by merger), and to compete
freely in, related distribution markets – but only if they treated "their" products 
on an even playing field with their competitors in the new markets.  Preferential 
treatment of their own products, however accomplished, would be compelling
prima facie evidence of abusing their core monopoly power.
• Where a court cannot easily manage to police preferential self-dealing across 
markets by a dominant platform company – which is frequently the case – the 
court should not be reluctant to deploy the remedy of structural divestiture.  
Companies themselves undertake such restructuring frequently throughout the 
economy; the surgery is not nearly so drastic or fraught with costs or risks as 
antitrust courts frequently assume.52
VI. Conclusion
This essay used the basic tenets of welfare economics to diagnose the sources of 
monopoly power in the Electronic Information Industry, and then to recommend
several major changes to the Industry's framework of law and policy. 
The paper segmented the Industry into its authoring, publishing, and distribution 
functions. The welfare economic concepts used here were novel only in stressing 
52
 It is likely that the divestiture remedy ordered by the trial court in the Microsoft case was vacated on 
appeal in part because the appellate court thought corporate divestiture a drastic and very risky undertaking 
– which is simply not so.  U.S. v. Microsoft, supra note 51, at 106-107. On divestiture remedies, see 
Thomas Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust Divestiture: The Path Less Traveled, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 
565 (2002); Thomas M. Leonard, Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: Alternate 
Structural Remedies in The Microsoft Case, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 803 (2001); R Craig Romaine & Steven 
C. Salop, Slap Their Wrists? Tie Their Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? Alternative Remedies for 
Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, 13 Antitrust 15 (1999).
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"creative destruction", a dynamic, cross-market process not often formally considered 
in conventional micro-economic analysis.
The diagnosis isolated as particularly important sources of monopoly power:
extensive protection of intellectual property and radio spectrum monopolies, the 
Industry's widespread use of "closed standards" to "privatize" the strong network 
effects that character ize most of the Industry's distribution markets, the formation and 
extension via merger of national-scale distribution networks, and the prevalence of 
cross-market leveraging of monopoly power across distribution markets and between 
distribution and publishing markets.
The policy changes recommended are immodest and plainly not candidates for 
political popularity in the Industry:
• Less protection for intellectual property and for radio spectrum monopolies
• Aggressive government promotion of open standards
• Closer scrutiny of nationalizing mergers among distribution networks.
• A ban on co-ownership of distribution and publishing properties
• Stringent limits on cross-market leveraging tactics across electronic distribution 
technology markets
These reforms would be resisted by the Industry's most successful players, or their 
shareholders and creditors, because these firms enjoy considerable monopoly profits
under current regimes of law and policy. The reforms would also find little favor 
among economic nationalists, because most of these Industry-leading firms are
headquartered in the U.S.
Such reforms would, however, help the Industry grow faster and contribute more 
value to the overall U.S. and world economies. It is true that the reforms would very 
likely shift the balance of the value created toward consumer surplus from the 
supplier profit category:  this is "good" or "bad" depending on one's distributional 
preferences.  The welfare economic baseline is simply that the reforms would expand 
the total value created over time.  That goal, I believe, remains the only respectable 
and conceptually coherent basis for any body of competition law.  
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